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A number of studies have examined the implications of preference interdependence. This 
paper models individual utility as depending either on the level of other people’s 
consumption or on the difference in consumption levels. It assumes that the impact of an 
increase in other people’s consumption on individual utility diminishes with the level of 
consumption, raising individual utility when that consumption is very small and lowering 
it when that consumption is very large. Based on that plausible assumption, the paper 
shows that, whether individual utility depends on the level of other people's consumption 
or on the difference in consumption levels, i) welfare declines with inequality, ii) 
equilibrium inequality is inefficient, and iii) the optimal intervention leads to a more 
equal distribution. Implications for the role of development institutions are examined.  
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There is a lot of evidence that individual utility is affected by other people’s consumption 
in the individual’s reference group. A number of studies have examined the implications 
of such preference interdependence. In this paper, individual utility is modeled as 
depending either on the level of other people’s consumption or on the difference in 
consumption levels, with preference interdependence taking a very specific form. The 
model assumes that the impact of an increase in other people’s consumption on 
individual utility diminishes with the level of consumption, raising individual utility 
when that consumption is very small and lowering it when that consumption is very 
large. For instance, it is assumed that typical individuals tend to feel concern for people 
who are doing badly, such as the homeless or the very sick, and that their utility increases 
when housing conditions for the homeless and the health of the very sick improve. On the 
other hand, it is assumed that the same individuals will tend to feel envy toward the 
extremely wealthy and that their utility will decline when the situation of the very 
wealthy improves. Based on these plausible assumptions, the paper shows that, whether 
individual utility depends on the level of other people's consumption or on the difference 
in consumption levels, i) welfare declines with inequality, ii) equilibrium inequality is 
inefficient, and iii) the optimal intervention leads to a more equal distribution. 
Implications for the role of development institutions are examined, and it is argued that, 
in order to maximize their impact, development institutions should allocate much of their 
efforts to helping the poorest developing countries and should focus on the poorest 
segments of the populations in middle-income countries. Data is provided to show that 
World Bank lending has moved in that direction recently through the absolute and 
relative increase in IDA lending. 
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On the Inefficiency of Inequality 
 
1. Introduction 
   Recent studies have shown a negative impact of inequality on growth.
1 As far as 
we know, a negative relationship between inequality and efficiency has not been 
established.
2  This paper aims to establish such a link.  
In neoclassical theory, the competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. On the other 
hand, “[c]onsumption externalities potentially break the link between Pareto optimality 
and competitive equilibria and open the door for beneficial government intervention” 
(Dupor and Liu, 2003). The idea that individual well-being depends on the consumption 
of others has been used in the literature in analyses of government policy (e.g., 
Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000; Dupor and Liu, 2003) and of stock market behavior (e.g., 
Abel, 1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999). That idea is used here to show that welfare 
declines as inequality rises, that equilibrium inequality is inefficient, and that some 
redistribution is optimal.
3   
                                                 
1 Empirical analyses of inequality and growth include Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini 
(1994), Benabou (1996) and Barro (2000).  Theoretical analyses include Banerjee and Newman (1991) 
and Galor and Zeira (1993). 
2 Various studies (e.g., Baland and Platteau, 1997; Bardhan et al. 2002; and Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan, 
forthcoming) have examined the relationship between inequality and the efficiency of provision of public 
or collective goods.   
3 A literature on social capital (including social norms, trust and cooperation) has interpreted recent 
findings from experimental and other empirical studies that individuals behave non-opportunistically or 
cooperatively in Prisoner’s Dilemma and other games by assuming that individuals have preferences for 
reciprocity or aversion to inequality (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Schiff,   3
Define “concern” (“jealousy”) as an increase (decrease) in individual utility when 
other people’s consumption rises. In other words, an increase in other people’s 
consumption generates a positive (negative) externality in the case of concern (jealousy). 
It is argued here that as general consumption grows, preferences gradually evolve from 
being dominated by concern to being dominated by jealousy.       
  Dupor and Liu (2003) examine the implications of jealousy on the one hand, and 
of “keeping up with the Joneses” on the other. This paper expands on the former in two 
ways. First, the analysis in Dupor and Liu assumes symmetry, with all individuals being 
identical. We extend the analysis to the case of inequality. Second, consumption 
externalities depend on the level of per capita consumption in their analysis. We also 
examine the case where consumption externalities depend on the difference between 
individual and per capita consumption. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of consumption 
externalities under asymmetry, with consumption externalities modeled in the two 
alternative ways described above. Section 3 deals with the role of development 
institutions, and Section 4 concludes.   
 
2. Model 
Whether individuals experience concern or jealousy with respect to other people’s 
consumption is likely to depend on the specifics of the situation. For instance, there is 
reason to believe that individual preferences exhibit concern for the consumption of 
                                                                                                                                                 
2002). This is not the case in this paper where, even though they may be affected by other people’s 
consumption, individuals are exclusively concerned with maximizing their own utility.   4
others when that consumption is very low, that the extent of concern diminishes as the 
consumption of others increases, and that concern eventually turns to jealousy as the 
consumption of others continues to increase. For instance, a reduction in homelessness or 
hunger is likely to make most people feel better. At the other extreme, individuals are 
likely to envy people who are buying their third summer home or who dine every day on 
specially flown-in out-of-season products.    
Let society be divided into two groups  X  and Y . The size of the population is 
fixed and normalized to unity, and the size of each group is  2 1 . Welfare is 
2 / ) (
Y X U U W + = . Per capita consumption is x and  y , respectively. Individual 
consumption is  Y X i ci ,    , = . Assume  x cX =  and  y cY = , i.e., there is symmetry within 
each of the two groups.   
We introduce consumption externalities in two alternative ways. In Section 2.1,  
consumption externalities depend on the per capita level of consumption of the two 
groups,  x and  y , and have the same impact on all individuals, irrespective of the group 
they belong to.
4 In Section 2.2, consumption externalities depend on the difference 
between individual and per capita consumption,  x ci −  and  y ci − ,  Y X i ,   = .
5  
 
                                                 
4 Thus, members of each group have the same concern or jealousy regarding other individuals’ 
consumption, regardless of which group the other individuals belong to. 
5 We abstract from externalities associated with per capita leisure, based on evidence that consumption 
externalities are more likely and more important (Solnick and Hemenway, 1998; Frank, 1999; Dupor and 
Liu, 2003).   5
2.1. Externalities Based on the Level of Per Capita Consumption  
Following Dupor and Liu (2003), assume that externalities are associated with the 
level of per capita consumption. Let the individual utility function be 
), , , , ( i i
i n y x c U U =   Y X i ,   = ,           ( 1 )  
where  i n  is individual labor,  0 , , , ≥ i i n y x c , and U is twice differentiable, with 
, 0 >
i c U  , 0 <
i n U  , 0 ≤
i in n Uy x n c i i , , ,   ∀ . Let  y x U U =  for  y x = . In order to abstract 
from redistribution based on interpersonal differences in marginal utility, we assume 
0 =
i ic c U , with 
Y X c c U U = . As in Dupor and Liu (2003), we assume  0 > + x c U U
X , 
0 > + y c U U
Y , i.e., individual utility increases when everyone’s consumption in the group 
increases. 
If 0 > x U  ( 0 > Y U ), preferences exhibit concern with respect to per capita 
consumption in group X   (Y ). If  0 < x U  ( 0 < Y U ), preferences exhibit jealousy.
6 Taking 
x (y ) as given, individuals in group X (Y ) choose  X c  ( Y c ) in order to maximize 
X U  
(






i i i i f f n f c , where 
i f  is the twice 
differentiable production function of individuals in group i,  Y X i ,   = . Assuming 










U ,  Y X i ,   = .        ( 2 )  
The social optimum is given by  
                                                 
6 Models with utility varying directly with own income and inversely with the average income of others  
date back at least to Pollak (1976).   6


















Y .    (3) 
The externality  ) (   y x U U  is multiplied by 2 in equation (3) because it affects 
individuals in both groups. Let  i t > 0 (< 0) be a proportional tax (subsidy). From the 
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and consumption is  T f t c
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U , Y X i ,   = .       ( 4 )  
From equations (3) and (4), the optimum tax rates for groups  X  and Y  are  
X c x X U U t / 2
* − = ,  
Y c y Y U U t / 2
* − = .       ( 5 )    
Assume  x U  ( y U ) > 0 for low values of x (y ) and  x U ( y U ) < 0 for high values 
of  x ( y ). Formally,  0 < xx U , , 0 < yy U   ∀ i i n y x c , , , , with  , 0 ) , , 0 , ( > i i x n y c U  
0 ) , , , ( < ∞ i i x n y c U ,  i i n y c , ,   ∀ , and  , 0 ) , 0 , , ( > i i y n x c U  0 ) , , , ( < ∞ i i y n x c U ,  i i n x c , ,   ∀ .  
 
Proposition 1: Equilibrium inequality is inefficient, and the optimal intervention 
entails a reduction in inequality.  
Proof: Denote per capita consumption by z , with  2 / ) ( y x z + = . We start from an 
initial case of full symmetry ( z y x = = ). Define  E z  as the level of per capita 
consumption where  0 = = y x U U  for  z y x = = .  There are three possible initial full-
symmetry equilibrium situations:z =  E z , z <  E z , or z >  E z .    7
If  E z z = , 0 = = y x U U  under full symmetry. From equation (5),  0
* * = = Y X t t , i.e., 
the private equilibrium is optimal. Assume now that individuals of group  ) (   Y X  become 
less (more) efficient at producing  ) ( y x c c , with  ) ( ) ( Y
Y
X
X n f n f <  for  Y X n n = , such that 
the new equilibrium is  α − = E z x  and  α + = E z y ,  0 > α . Per capita consumption is 
unchanged, but by virtue of  xx U ,0 < yy U , we have  x U  > 0 and  y U  < 0. From equation 
(5), 
* * 0 Y X t t < < . 
Thus, the private equilibrium is not optimal under asymmetry when z = E z . 
Consumption of group    X (  Y ) generates positive (negative) externalities and is thus too 
small (large). Optimal intervention entails a subsidy for group  X (the poor) and a tax on 
group   Y (the rich).  
If  E z z < , 0 > = y x U U  under full symmetry (implying a subsidy  0  
* * < = Y X t t  for 
both groups). With  α − = z x  and  α + = z y , 
*
X t  falls (a larger subsidy) and 
*
Y t  increases 
(a smaller subsidy or a tax), with 
* *    Y X t t < . If  E z z > , 0 < = y x U U  under full symmetry 
(with 0  
* * > = Y X t t ). With  α − = z x  and  α + = z y , 
*
X t  falls (a smaller tax or a subsidy) 
and 
*
Y t  increases (a higher tax), with 
* *    Y X t t < . Thus, irrespective of whether z  is larger, 
equal or smaller than  E z , the equilibrium distribution is excessively unequal from the 
efficiency viewpoint, and the optimal policy results is a redistribution from the rich to the 
poor and a reduction in inequality. 
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Proposition 2: An increase in inequality reduces welfare. 
Proof: An increase in α  has no impact on per capita consumption but raises 
inequality. The impact of an increase in inequality on group  X  is 
y x c
X U U U U
X + − − = ∂ ∂ α /  and on group Y is  x y c
Y U U U U




c c U U
U U
W
X Y − +
−
= ∂ ∂ α   <  0.     (6)   
The first term is equal to zero. Recall that  xx U ,0 < yy U  and  y x U U =  for  y x = . 
Since  x <  y ,  y x U U >  and the term in parenthesis is negative. Thus,  α ∂ ∂ / W  < 0.
7 
Evidence supporting this result is provided at the end of Section 2.2. 
 
2.2. Externalities Based on the Difference in Consumption Levels  
We assume in this section that externalities depend on the difference in 
consumption levels. This is assumed for instance by Robson (1992) in his study of the 
impact of relative wealth status on risk-taking behavior. Let the individual utility function 
be ), , , , ( i i i i
i n y c x c c U U − − =   Y X i ,   = , where  0 , , , ≥ i i n y x c , and U is twice 
differentiable, with  , 0 >
i c U  , 0 <
i n U  0 ≤
i in n U ,  y x n c i i , , ,   ∀ . Assume that 
0    = = − − y c x c X Y U U  for  0 = − = − y c x c X Y . Since individuals are identical within each 
group (that is,  x cX =  and  y cY = ), externalities associated with consumption differences 
only occur across groups, and the utility function simplifies to 
), , , ( X X X
X n y c c U U − =  ) , , ( Y Y Y
Y n x c c U U − = ,    (7) 
                                                 
7  Assuming diminishing marginal utility would reinforce this result because the first term would also be 
negative.   9
with   x c y c Y X U U − − = for  x c y c Y X − = − , and  0 > + −y c c X X U U ,  0 > + −x c c y Y U U , 
i.e., individual utility in a group increases when everyone’s consumption in that group 
increases. Assuming conditions for an interior solution are satisfied, the first-order 
condition is  
















U U .    (8) 
The social optimum is given by  
0 = − + + − − x c X
n
n






U U ;  0 = − + + − − y c Y
n
n






U U . (9) 
As in Section 2, let  i t be a proportional tax or subsidy rate. The private optimum 
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* .      ( 1 1 )    
If  y c x c X Y U U − −   ,  < (>) 0, preferences exhibit concern (jealousy). For instance, if x 
falls so that  x cY −  increases, the externality  x cY U −  < 0 if individuals in group Y  feel 
concern for the fall in consumption in group  X , and  x cY U −  > 0 if the individuals feel 
jealousy. Assume individuals are concerned (jealous) about those whose consumption is 
lower (higher) than their own, with  y cx U − ( x cy U − )  ⋚  0 for  y cx − ( x cy − )  ⋛  0  and 
y c y c X X U − − , ,  x c x c Y Y U − − ,  < 0.    10
Proposition 1*: Equilibrium inequality is inefficient, and the optimal intervention 
entails a reduction in inequality.   
Proof: We start from an equilibrium with 
Y f =
X f  and   0 = − = − y c x c X Y . 
Then, 0    = = − − y c x c X Y U U  and  0
* * = = Y X t t  (equation 11). Let 
Y f  increase and 
X f  
decrease, such that  y  increases by β  and x decreases by β , with  x cy −  =  β 2  and 
y cx − =  β 2 − . Then,  y cx U −  > 0 >  x cy U −  and 
* *    0 Y X t t < < .  
  As in Section 2.1, we find that equilibrium inequality is inefficient and that the 
optimal policy reduces inequality by redistributing from the rich  (Y ) to the poor ( X ).  
 
  Proposition 2*: An increase in inequality reduces welfare. 
 Proof: Inequality increases with β , with  x c y c c
X
Y X X U U U U − − + − − = ∂ ∂ β / ,  
y c x c c
Y
X Y Y U U U U − − − + = ∂ ∂ β / , and  = ∂ ∂ β / W ) (
2
y c x c
c c
X Y
X Y U U
U U
− − − +
−
. The first 
term is equal to zero. The second term is negative because  x c y c Y X U U − − > > 0 . Thus, 
β ∂ ∂ / W < 0.    
Is there empirical support for the conclusion that an increase in inequality reduces 
welfare? Alesina et al. (2002) explore whether inequality affects individual utility, with 
utility measured in terms of survey answers about happiness. They find, after controlling 
for individual income and a set of other individual and aggregate characteristics, that in  
the US, a 10 percentage point increase in inequality reduces the number of people who 
report themselves as “Very Happy” by 18.5% and increases those who report themselves 
as “Not Too Happy” by 26%, with the corresponding figures for the EU being similar,   11
namely, 21% and 27%, respectively. These findings are consistent with the implications 
of the model. 
 
3. The Role of Development Institutions 
Development institutions can help developing countries by supporting policy 
reform and investing in public projects with high social rates of return, thereby raising 
consumption for a given amount of work. Assume first one group, with the externality 
depending on per capita consumption  x. For a given amount of work, the impact on 
utility of increased consumption is  x c U U + , where the first term is the impact of an 
increase in own consumption and the second term is the impact of an increase in the 
consumption of others.  
As discussed in Section 2.1, the externality  x U  is likely to be positive at low 
levels of consumption. On the other hand, at high levels of consumption,  x U  is likely to 
be negative and the impact  x c U U +  is likely to be small. Inkeles (1993) argues that 
higher income is likely to raise utility in poorer countries, while he and Frank (1999) 
argue that higher income need not raise utility in rich societies.  
What is the empirical evidence? Based on time series studies, Easterlin (1995) 
reports that higher income has little or no effect on happiness in developed countries (the 
US and nine European countries) and in one country, Japan, that went from being a 
developing country to being a developed one. No time series studies are reported for 
developing countries. Based on international cross-sectional analysis, Frey and Stutzer 
(2002) find (p. 90) that “… higher income clearly raises happiness in developing   12
countries, while the effect is small, if it exists at all, in rich countries.” Thus, it appears 
that the social return to increased income declines with the income level. 
Based on the arguments and evidence provided, it does seem plausible that 
x c U U +  is larger in developing countries than in developed ones, and is larger in least 
developing countries than in middle-income ones. Consequently, in order to maximize 
their impact, development institutions should allocate much of their efforts to helping the 
poorest developing countries and should focus on the poorest segments of the populations 
in middle-income countries. This also holds when externalities depend on consumption 
differences. The first of these efforts would lower cross-country inequality while the 
second would lower within-country inequality.
8  
Note that these implications are based on the welfare arguments developed here 
and not on arguments that the poor are more deserving per se. Assuming the latter would 
reinforce the arguments made here. 
The World Bank Group’s lending to the public sector is done through two main 
lending windows, the World Bank and the International Development Agency (IDA). 
IDA loans are really closer to grants and are destined for the world’s poorest countries. 
According to the World Bank Annual Report (2002), the recent trend has been to increase 
lending commitments through the IDA window, from $billion 4.4 in FY 2000 to $billion 
8.1 in FY 2002, or an 85% increase over two years. As a share of total lending 
                                                 
8 Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) distinguish between cross-country and within-country inequality in 
their study of world inequality in the last two centuries. They find that world inequality was mainly due 
to  within-country differences in the early part of the period and to cross-country differences in the later 
part. Their findings indicate that focusing on cross-country differences may be more effective in reducing 
world inequality.     13
commitments, IDA loans increased from 28.5% to 42% over these two years, or by close 
to 50%. This trend, together with the increased focus on poverty alleviation in recent 
years, is consistent with the implications of the paper.         
 
4. Conclusion     
The paper examined the implications of the interdependence of preferences. It 
expands on aspects of Dupor and Liu (2003) by examining optimal interventions under 
inequality and by considering two alternative types of interdependencies. In the first case, 
as in Dupor and Liu (2003), a low (high) level of consumption generates concern 
(jealousy) in other consumers. In the second case, a low (high) level of consumption 
relative to that of others generates concern (jealousy) in the latter. In both cases, we show 
that welfare declines as inequality rises, that equilibrium inequality is inefficient, and that 
the optimal intervention lowers inequality. The analysis suggests that development 
institutions should allocate most of their efforts to the poorest countries and to the poorest 
segments of populations in middle-income countries, two groups where the social return 
to increased consumption is likely to be high. 
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